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Is Owning Stock an Abnormally Dangerous 
Activity? Shareholder Limited Liability in 
Tort 
Daniel P. Schley, CFA 
Academics have contested the merits of shareholder limited 
liability for decades.1 As part of this discussion, some of limited 
liability’s critics cite tort law to conclude that corporate law 
erroneously shields shareholders from personal liability.2 They 
contend that tort law would not so egregiously allow 
shareholders to externalize costs onto tort victims who have no 
control over the type of legal entity that injures them.3 But tort 
law does not follow this logic. It does not examine the type of the 
defendant merely to search for the deepest pockets to find 
liability.4 Moreover, corporate officers and directors—not 
shareholders—control the ability for the corporation to pay its 
debts as they come due (corporate capitalization).5  
Given these academic conclusions’ inconsistency with tort 
law and corporate governance, this Article reconsiders whether 
shareholders would benefit from limited liability in tort and finds 
that tort law, like the current corporate law regime, would 
uphold shareholder limited liability. Shareholders would not be 
strictly liable for corporate torts. Rather, they would only be 
liable to the extent they failed to use reasonable care. This 
Article reaches this conclusion by examining a well-known Judge 
Richard Posner decision which emphasized that strict liability for 
abnormally dangerous activities is only relevant to activities, not 
 
  Daniel P. Schley, CFA, is an attorney at Portnoff Law Associates, Ltd. In King of 
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 1 See, e.g., Paddy Ireland, Limited Liability, Shareholder Rights and the Problem of 
Corporate Irresponsibility, 34 CAMBRIDGE J. OF ECON. 837 (2010); Stephanie Blankenburg 
et al., Limited Liability and the Modern Corporation in Theory and in Practice, 34 
CAMBRIDGE J. OF ECON. 821 (2010). 
 2 See discussion infra Part II.  
 3 See discussion infra Part II. 
 4 See discussion infra Part III.  
 5 See discussion infra Parts II, IV. 
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substances.6 With respect to shareholder personal liability for 
corporate torts, the relevant activity is corporate capitalization, 
not the shareholder contribution of equity capital and related 
limited control rights (the substance). Because a corporation’s 
officers and directors can prevent undercapitalization through 
the use of due care, negligence—not strict liability—is the 
appropriate regime for shareholder personal liability.7 Corporate 
law understands this intuition by only allowing such liability 
through the use of piercing the corporate veil, which resembles 
negligence. Though tort law’s conclusions regarding shareholder 
liability align with corporate law, tort law independently still 
provides a valuable insight into understanding the hazy doctrine 
of piercing the corporate veil and corporate purpose more 
generally. This Article ends with some recommendations for 
further research. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The proper scope of the corporation remains a vigorous debate. 
Often at its crux is shareholder limited liability. Numerous 
academics note with suspicion this unique aspect of corporate law 
which allows shareholders to avoid personal liability to a 
corporation’s creditors.8 Generally only liable up to their  
paid-in-capital, though able to reap potentially unlimited gains, 
shareholders purportedly push corporations to take on excessive 
risk.9 These risks are not merely financial (in the form of excess 
leverage), but even legal: if a corporation breaks the law, it is only 
the corporation—not the shareholders—that pays the penalty or 
fine.10 These perverse incentives, coupled with the prevailing belief 
under shareholder primacy theory that corporate managers have 
the sole obligation to maximize shareholder profits,11 have led some 
scholars to conclude that the corporation is best described in human 
terms as a psychopath— irresponsible, manipulative, asocial, and 
unable to feel remorse.12 Others conclude corporate limited liability 
 
 6 Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 7 This Article assumes that there has been no election under applicable law for 
shareholder management of the corporation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 351 (West 
2020). 
 8 See, e.g., David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of 
the Corporation, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139, 148 (2013). 
 9 See Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for 
Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1247 (2002). 
 10 See Ciepley, supra note 8, at 148. 
 11 See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
 12 See JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND 
POWER 56–57 (2004). 
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is merely a historical accident, which tort law would not tolerate.13 
Academics claim the defects of the corporation create real 
consequences for the economy at large and undermine economic 
growth.14 With the rise of the shareholder primacy theory, limited 
liability now poses an even greater risk as corporate management 
own more stock and stock options.15 In the eyes of such critics, 
limited liability is simply a mistake which should be eliminated.16 
Other academics strenuously contest these conclusions about 
the corporation and shareholder limited liability.17 Judge Frank 
H. Easterbrook and Professor Daniel R. Fischel, for example, 
defend limited liability noting that it decreases the need to 
monitor investments and other shareholders, promotes free 
transfer of shares, allows for market pricing and diversification, 
and optimizes investment decisions.18 
So, should shareholders retain limited liability? Or should 
they instead be unlimitedly personally liable for corporate torts? 
Would eliminating limited liability deter the purported corporate 
incentive to externalize costs by encouraging shareholders to 
monitor corporate activities more closely? Or are shareholders, 
despite their limited control rights, just too powerless and 
anonymous to influence managerial decisions? 
One need not look further than to the absence of examples of 
corporations failing to compensate their tort victims to reach the 
conclusion that limited liability is a phantom problem.19 Where 
are all of the uncompensated tort victims if limited liability 
creates such inexorable danger? The reality is that shareholders 
are largely unable to use the corporation to externalize costs onto 
creditors. Other corporate stakeholders, like insurers, 
 
 13 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder 
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991) [hereinafter Toward Unlimited 
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts]; Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The 
Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 431–32 (2000) [hereinafter The 
Essential Role of Organizational Law]. 
 14 See The Essential Role of Organizational Law, supra note 13. 
 15 See Ciepley, supra note 8, at 148; see also William Lazonick, Profits Without 
Prosperity, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2014, at 3, 4–5. 
 16 See Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 13, at 
1880. 
 17 See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried & Charles C.Y. Wang, Short-Termism and Capital Flows 
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 342/2017, 2018), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2895161. 
 18 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 94–96 (1985). 
 19 See Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital 
Markets Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387, 421 (1992) (“[T]he evidence is hardly 
overwhelming that limited liability causes a significant increase in a corporation’s 
willingness to engage in risky behavior.”). 
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debtholders and officers and directors, have incentives aligned 
with any potential tort creditor (that is, a contingent creditor) 
and are successfully able to police the corporation to such 
contingent creditor’s benefit. This is exactly why share prices in 
California did not increase after the introduction of limited 
liability.20 If cost externalization were possible, those share prices 
would have increased. 
Though concerns about limited liability may only exist in the 
ivory tower, most critiques of shareholder personal liability have 
relied on the practical difficulties of shareholder personal 
liability.21 None, however, has focused on the theoretical—the 
truth that tort law actually supports the current corporate law 
limited liability regime.  
Tort law would not hold shareholders personally liable for 
corporate torts. This becomes obvious when analogizing personal 
shareholder liability to tort law’s strict liability for abnormally 
hazardous activities. Such strict liability attaches only to 
activities, not substances. The relevant activity for shareholder 
personal liability is corporate capitalization, not the contribution 
of equity capital and limited associated shareholder control 
rights. A corporation’s officers and directors, not its shareholders, 
control corporate capitalization. Because when officers and 
directors use due care, corporations are almost certainly able to 
pay debts—including contingent debts like compensation to 
potential tort creditors—as they come due, a shareholder would 
not be strictly liable for corporate torts. A shareholder only 
becomes liable to the extent he or she controls corporate 
capitalization and then fails to use reasonable care in doing so. 
As this Article explains in detail, that is merely to say that a 
shareholder only faces personal liability when courts pierce the 
corporate veil—the current corporate law regime. 
This Article reaches these conclusions by analyzing whether 
shareholders would be personally liable in tort law instead of 
corporate law. Part II discusses recent developments in academic 
understanding of the corporation and how they should affect the 
interpretation of prior academic work. Part III introduces strict 
liability, discusses its relevance to shareholders, and analogizes a 
well-known strict liability case to the question of shareholder 
liability for corporate torts. Part IV compares this Article’s 
findings to the current state of corporate law for shareholder 
 
 20 See Mark I. Weinstein, Limited Liability in California 1928–31: It’s the Lawyers, 7 
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 439, 440 (2005). 
 21 See generally Grundfest, supra note 19. 
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liability for corporate torts. Part V reconsiders corporate purpose 
in light of tort law. In conclusion, Part VI provides some final 
remarks and suggestions of further relevant research. 
II. SHAREHOLDER PERSONAL LIABILITY IN TORT TO THE 
CORPORATION’S TORT CREDITORS 
The most prominent argument for imposing shareholder 
personal liability for corporate torts proposes liability based on two 
justifications. One centers around the fact that it is inefficient and 
unfair as a matter of policy for tort victims to have no control over 
the type of legal entity that harms. The other supports shareholder 
liability for corporate torts given their ownership of the corporation 
and control of its capitalization. These justifications, however, are 
misguided. First, tortious liability depends not merely on finding 
the deepest pockets—because a corporation may or may not have 
the requisite capital—but, rather, on providing proper incentives to 
control outcomes. Moreover, shareholders neither truly own the 
corporation nor sufficiently control corporate capitalization to justify 
their personal liability for corporate acts.  
A. The Prominent Argument in Tort Favoring Shareholder 
Personal Liability  
Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman provide 
a prominent argument for shareholder personal liability.22 They 
even posture that corporate limited liability likely is a vestige of 
a historical accident in the development of corporate law.23 They 
argue that it is simply too crude a check. Instead, they advance 
the theory that, under tort law, shareholders should be 
personally liable because they are in the best position to avoid 
and insure against costs.24  
Their principal rationale is that tort law would find 
shareholder limited liability inefficient.25 Limited liability allows 
shareholders to externalize costs onto society.26 Unlike corporate 
contract creditors, a corporation’s tort creditors are unable, ex 
ante, to negotiate for shareholder limited liability.27 Shareholders 
take advantage of this putative loophole by undercapitalizing.28 
 
 22 The Essential Role of Organizational Law, supra note 13, at 431. 
 23 Id. 
 24 See Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 13, at 
1918. 
 25 See The Essential Role of Organizational Law, supra note 13, at 431. 
 26 Id.  
 27 Id.  
 28 Id. 
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In doing so, shareholders not only leave tort creditors 
uncompensated when the corporation is insolvent, but also 
succeed in shielding their own personal assets from those 
creditors.29 Involuntary creditors are therefore defenseless.30 
Because these involuntary creditors have no control over the type 
of legal entity that injures them, Hansmann and Kraakman note 
that it is inefficient, not to mention unfair, to allow the amount a 
tort victim recovers to depend merely upon the legal form of the 
organization responsible for their injury.31 Shareholders 
benefitting, for instance, “from intentional dumping of toxic 
wastes, from marketing hazardous products without warnings, or 
from exposing employees without their knowledge and consent to 
working conditions known by the firm to pose substantial health 
risks, should not be able to avoid the resulting costs simply by 
limiting the capitalization of their firm.”32 Abolishing limited 
liability would, in their view, force shareholders to face full 
liability for potential tort losses. Share prices and the cost of 
equity would decrease and increase, respectively, to account for 
such liability.33  
Hansmann and Kraakman suggest replacing shareholder 
limited liability with a pro rata personal liability regime.34 They 
caution that, in abolishing limited liability, courts would still 
need to determine which costs are efficiently and equitably borne 
by a corporation and its shareholders but note that shareholders 
would, in at least certain circumstances, be in the best position to 
avoid and insure against cost.35 In those situations, the authors 
submit that shareholders should be personally liable for 
corporate torts.36  
The academic literature critiquing Hansmann and 
Kraakman’s proposal have done so largely on practical grounds.37 
Professor Joseph A. Grundfest, for example, contends that capital 
market participants are sufficiently agile to arbitrage away 
personal liability for equity ownership.38 In Grundfest’s view, 
shareholders would first rearrange themselves so that personal 
 
 29 Id. at 393–94.  
 30 Id. 
 31 See The Essential Role of Organizational Law, supra note 13, at 431–32. 
 32 Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 13, at 1917. 
 33 See id. at 1907. 
 34 See id. at 1917–19. 
 35 See id. 
 36 See id. 
 37 See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 19, at 388 n.3; Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited 
Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens, 106 HARV. L. REV. 387, 387 (1992). 
 38 See id. at 390. 
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assets would be unreachable under a proportionate personal 
liability regime.39 Shareholders with personal wealth would only 
purchase shares of companies with little risk of personal asset 
exposure.40 Only persons with little or no personal assets or, 
more likely, little to no asset exposure, would purchase the equity 
of riskier firms.41 Furthermore, were proportionate personal 
liability implemented at the state level, constitutional limitations 
on personal jurisdiction would not allow jurisdiction over passive 
shareholders.42 Even a statute at the federal level would face 
problems obtaining personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants 
given the principles of international comity.43  
Constitutional problems are compounded by the logistics of 
collection. Domestic shareholders not party to the original action 
would attempt to relitigate.44 The value of shares owned by many 
shareholders is less than the costs to proceed with an action 
against them.45 Enforcing a judgment against a foreign 
shareholder—or even identifying that shareholder—could be 
impossible.46 Individuals with personal assets seeking exposure 
to “riskier” equities could also avoid owning shares altogether 
through derivatives, which would achieve returns similar to 
those attained through ownership of traditional shares with 
limited liability.47 
Corporations themselves would respond adversely to 
proportionate personal liability. They would issue less equity in 
favor of debt and equity-like instruments, like convertible bonds 
and warrants—all of which lack proportionate personal liability 
of shares.48 Intermediaries like investment banks could create 
structured products to allow the ultimate beneficiaries equity 
like returns without the concomitant proportionate liability.49 No 
amount of regulation would adequately prevent all of these 
parties from ultimately protecting the shareholder-like party 
from personal proportionate liability.50  
 
 39 See id. at 387. 
 40 See id. 
 41 See id. 
 42 See id. at 395. 
 43 See id. at 397. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 398. 
 47 Id. at 402. 
 48 Id. at 409. 
 49 Id. at 408. 
 50 Id. at 416. 
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Though these critiques merit their own consideration, they 
do not consider Hansmann and Kraakman’s underlying 
theoretical claim that tort law would not allow shareholder 
limited liability.51 This Article considers Hansmann and 
Kraakman’s assumptions about both the corporation and tort law 
with respect to shareholder limited liability. 
B. The Prominent Basis in Tort Favoring Shareholder Personal 
Liability Relies on Flawed Assumptions about both Tort Law and 
the Corporation 
Hansmann and Kraakman’s argument that tort law fails to 
explain limited liability relies on questionable assumptions about 
both tort law and the corporation. First, the Restatement of Torts 
prefers allocative rather than distributive liability.52 In other 
words, whether a defendant should be liable in tort—and under 
which liability regime—should depend on which regime will most 
effectively control outcomes, not who has the deepest pockets.53 
In determining shareholder personal liability for corporate torts, 
however, Hansmann and Kraakman argue in favor of liability 
based on the latter.54 They contend as a matter of policy that 
shareholders ought to be personally liable merely because the 
tort plaintiff has no control over the wealth of the tortfeasor 
corporation.55 Indeed, they extrapolate from their position that 
the amount of damages for shareholder liability should depend 
on the structure of the particular corporate defendant; 
shareholders who are corporate parents of a wholly-owned 
subsidiary should bear greater costs for the subsidiary’s torts 
than shareholders who are natural persons.56 These rationales 
are inconsistent with tort doctrine. Tort liability, and the extent 
of damages for such liability, is not simply based on whether the 
defendant’s shareholders are artificial or natural persons—who 
could, in theory, be equally as wealthy and equally as culpable.57 
 
 51 See generally, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra 
note 13.  
 52 See, e.g., Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1181 (7th 
Cir. 1990). 
 53 Id. at 1181–82. 
 54 See Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 13, at 
1916–17. 
 55 Id.  
 56 See Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 13, at 
1917. 
 57 Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 110–11 (arguing courts may be more 
likely to pierce the veil when the shareholder is a parent corporation of a corporate 
subsidiary, but only because such a corporate shareholder is more likely to attempt to 
externalize costs, not because such a corporate shareholder is wealthier than a natural 
shareholder). 
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Indeed, judgment-proof natural persons often leave victims 
uncompensated, yet tort law does not strain to find some nexus to 
a wealthier party. Rather, as even Hansmann and Kraakman 
admit, liability should be based on the action in question and 
which actors are in the best position to avoid the relevant 
accidents.58 Hansmann and Kraakman offer no argument for why 
shareholders are corporate actors in the best position to avoid 
accidents. 
They likely fail to do so because they reach their conclusions 
based on two related yet problematic theories of the corporation, 
which incorrectly describe the shareholder’s relationship with the 
corporation. Under Property (“Principal/Agent”) Theory, 
corporations are merely aggregations of shareholders’ property.59 
Shareholders are therefore owners of the corporation and 
principals for whom the corporate officers and directors serve as 
agents.60 This statement, however, is more applicable to a 
partnership where partners function as the sole owners and 
central contracting parties of the partnership.61 A modern 
business corporation, however, meaningfully departs from this 
construct for two reasons. First, corporate assets and liabilities 
belong not to shareholders, but to the corporation as a distinct 
entity. Second, shareholders are not principals to whom the 
directors owe duties as agents.62  
Shareholders are not owners because they merely own 
corporate stock—a contractual obligation between the 
shareholder and the corporation.63 This contractual obligation 
entitles shareholders to own neither the corporation nor its 
assets.64 For example, owning Apple shares does not entitle a 
shareholder to take iPads from an Apple store.65 The corporation 
itself, rather, owns itself and its assets. A shareholder’s rights 
with respect to a corporation are therefore not dissimilar to other 
parties in contract with the corporation, such as debtholders.66 
 
 58 Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 13, at 
1916. 
 59 LYNN STOUT, The Economic Nature of The Corporation, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 337, 345 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017).  
 60 Id. at 345. 
 61 David Ciepley, Member Corporations, Property Corporations, and Constitutional 
Rights, 11 LAW & ETHICS OF HUM. RTS. 31, 43 (2017). 
 62 Id.  
 63 Id. at 45. 
 64 Id. 
 65 LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 37 (2012). 
 66 Id. at 37–38. 
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Shareholders are also not principals to whom the directors 
owe duties as their agents.67 A principal must “exist[] prior to, 
and independent of, the hiring of the agent.”68 In a corporation, 
however, it is only after the firm’s incorporator appoints a board 
of directors to act on the corporation’s behalf that the corporation 
has the power and ability to issue stock to shareholders.69 Only 
the corporation and its board exist prior to the alleged principal 
—the shareholders.70 Moreover, although shareholders have 
certain limited rights (to vote on certain corporate matters, sue 
the corporation, and sell shares), they do not control the 
corporation’s behavior, a key component of agency.71 To the 
contrary, the board of directors controls corporate actions.72  
Hansmann and Kraakman, however, in the vein of Property 
Theory, treat shareholders as owners and principals of the 
corporation, and the corporate directors as the shareholders’ agents.73 
They note the identical concern that both owners and 
shareholders may use the corporate form to limit their personal 
liability.74 One can only harmonize these statements by arguing 
that they are in fact, identical—that shareholders are the owners 
of the corporation. Moreover, their argument suggests 
shareholder control such that they would, in fact, be principals. 
They contend that shareholders—not the corporation through its 
officers and directors—control the corporation’s capitalization.75 
Only by ignoring the role of corporate directors are they able to 
conclude that corporations themselves should have no liability at 
all if shareholders have insufficient control over corporate 
managers of the corporation.76 The board of directors and officers 
control corporate capitalization, not shareholders.77 Shareholders 
 
 67 Id. at 42. 
 68 Id.  
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id.; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.04 (AM. L. INST. 2006). 
 72 ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 114 
(4th ed., 2013). 
 73 See The Essential Role of Organizational Law, supra note 13, at 429. 
 74 Compare The Essential Role of Organizational Law, supra note 13, at 431 
(“[O]rganizational law is essential to shield owners of an organization from personal 
liability.”), with Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 
13, at 1917 (“Shareholders . . . should not be able to avoid . . . costs simply by limiting the 
capitalization of their firm.”). 
 75 See Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 13, at 
1919. 
 76 Id. at 1908. 
 77 It is true that, subsequent to the issuance of shares, shareholders must normally 
vote on changes to a corporation’s bylaws. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (West 2020). 
The bylaws include the number of authorized shares a corporation may issue. See § 109(b) 
(Westlaw). One could argue that shareholders could derivatively control corporate 
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do not decide when to issue (or buy back) equity or debt, issue 
dividends, when and how to insure for contingent liabilities, or 
manage the corporation’s working capital.78 These actions fall 
exclusively within the purview of the corporation’s board of 
directors and its management.79 Only if one views the 
shareholder as a principal, can one suggest actual shareholder 
control of corporate assets—this is simply not the case in the 
corporation.80 Finally, Hansmann and Kraakman’s remedies also 
suggest a belief in shareholders as principals.81 For example, 
they argue in favor of shareholder personal liability based on the 
corporation’s management’s awareness that a plaintiff will file a 
tort claim against the corporation.82 Such vicarious liability 
ought only be imputed to the employee’s principal, which is the 
corporation itself, not the shareholder. 
A second theory on which Hansmann and Kraakman may 
rely is Aggregate Theory, which treats the corporation as an 
aggregation of natural persons.83 Under this view, corporations 
are merely “composed” of human beings: “a form of organization 
used by human beings to achieve desired ends.”84 Aggregate 
Theory, similar to Property Theory, crucially fails to distinguish 
 
capitalization by rejecting a corporation’s request for an increase in the number of 
authorized shares so that the corporation could raise equity to provide for adequate 
corporate capitalization. Such shareholder “control” of capitalization, however, is better 
described as within the vein of ultra vires (that is, notice to shareholders of the scope of 
the corporation) as opposed to actual control of corporate capitalization. See PINTO, supra 
note 72. Indeed, several examples show how such alleged corporate control is illusory. 
First, articles of incorporation may permit directors to adopt, amend, or repeal bylaws 
without shareholder approval. See § 141 (Westlaw). Second, the corporation (through the 
board of directors) does not need shareholder approval to purchase insurance (such as a 
credit default swap) which could achieve results similar to an equity issuance. See id. 
Finally, a corporation’s board of directors does not require shareholder approval of a 
reverse stock split. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Reverse Stock Splits, (Aug. 16, 2020, 
1:24 PM), https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-
basics/glossary/reverse-stock-splits [http://perma.cc/XDT2-PS4V]. A reverse stock split 
would reduce the number of shares outstanding, thereby allowing the corporation to issue 
sufficient equity for adequate capitalization. See id. Despite shareholders’ limited control 
rights, corporate capitalization ultimately remains in hands of the board of directors, not 
shareholders.  
 78 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(c), 351 (West 2020).  
 79 Id. § 141(c). 
 80 True, such statements may not apply to controlling shareholders, who may 
derivatively control a corporation and as such are subject to fiduciary duties. See Iman 
Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties For Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
1255, 1269–70 (2008). I discuss strict liability for controlling shareholders in a subsequent 
section. 
 81 See Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 13, at 
1897. 
 82 See id. 
 83 See STOUT, supra note 59, at 344–45. 
 84 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 706 (2014). 
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the corporate form, with its separate personality, from 
partnerships or proprietorships.85 
In the vein of Aggregate Theory, Hansmann and Kraakman 
treat the shareholders and the corporation as identical. They 
note separate yet equivalent concerns that shareholders, 
corporations, and owners should not be able to use limited 
liability to externalize costs.86 These statements, when viewed 
together, ignore that the corporation is an entity distinct from its 
shareholders. Consider, for example, Hansmann and Kraakman’s 
concern regarding a corporation’s ability to limit its liability.87 
They do not suggest apprehension that a corporation can limit 
liability through the creation of a subsidiary.88 Rather, they 
express a concern that a corporation can limit its liabilities 
through its own incorporation.89 Corporations cannot limit 
liability differently than any natural person. Because a 
corporation owns itself and is its own principal, it will be 
vicariously liable for its agents’ actions in tort.90 Hansmann and 
Kraakman can only argue such corporate use of limited liability 
by treating the shareholder and corporation as identical. 
Although Hansmann and Kraakman’s basis for shareholder 
personal liability may be flawed, this does not necessarily 
indicate that their conclusions are wrong. Tort law may still 
suggest shareholder personal liability for corporate torts. The 
relevant question, as even Hansmann and Kraakman 
acknowledge, is whether shareholders have enough control over 
corporate managers to have a significant effect on the probability 
 
 85 See STOUT, supra note 59, at 345. 
 86 Compare The Essential Role of Organizational Law, supra note 13, at 431 
(“[O]rganizational law is essential to shield owners of an organization from personal 
liability.”) (emphasis added), with Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate 
Torts, supra note 13, at 1917 (“Shareholders . . . should not be able to avoid . . . costs 
simply by limiting the capitalization of their firm.”) (emphasis added), and Toward 
Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 13, at 1919 (“[A]llowing 
corporations to avoid tort liability through the simple device of limited liability seems . . . 
highly suspect.”) (emphasis added). 
 87 See Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 13, at 
1919. 
 88 See id. 
 89 Id. (“We do not want to exaggerate our faith in tort law as a means of controlling 
behavior. It is a very rough and costly mechanism. But it usefully discourages the most 
severe forms of opportunistic cost externalization. Moreover, if any class of actors is likely 
to respond rationally to the deterrence incentives created by tort law, it is corporations 
and their shareholders. Similarly, if tort law is to have any role in shifting risks to low-
cost insurers, then using it to shift risks to the equity market makes sense. Consequently, 
allowing corporations to avoid tort liability through the simple device of limited liability 
seems, at the very least, highly suspect.”) (emphasis added). 
 90 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.04, 3.04 (AM. L. INST. 2006). 
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that the corporation will commit a tort.91 Although shareholders 
are neither principals nor owners of the corporation, and are 
distinct from the corporation itself, they do retain some control 
through their capacity to vote, sue, and sell shares.92 What 
amount of control, if any, should render them liable in tort for 
corporate malfeasance? 
III. RECONSIDERING SHAREHOLDER LIMITED LIABILITY IN TORT: 
INTUITION AND APPLICABILITY OF STRICT LIABILITY AND 
ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES 
A. Strict Liability Provides an Appropriate Intuition for 
Shareholder Personal Liability for Corporate Torts 
To answer the question of how tort law would deal with 
shareholder liability for corporate torts, we must first consider 
which relevant accident control regime—strict liability or 
negligence—would apply. Strict liability finds liability regardless 
of the tortfeasor’s use of due care.93 As such, it is meant to control 
care and activity levels, whereas negligence—the typical liability 
regime in tort—controls only care levels.94 Care level refers to the 
level of care one can adopt when engaging in an activity, such as 
driving at a reasonable speed with reasonable caution.95 Activity 
level, on the other hand, refers to the extent someone engages in 
an activity at all, such as how often one drives a car.96 Although 
negligence and strict liability have the same effect on care 
levels—both incent an actor to take additional precaution to the 
extent that it is less than the expected costs of an accident—only 
a strict liability regime encourages an actor not to engage in the 
activity at all.97 
Professor George Fletcher argues that strict liability rules 
should apply when an actor exposes another to non-reciprocal 
risks: an asymmetry where an actor’s conduct endangers 
another, but the latter’s conduct does not endanger the former.98 
 
 91 See Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 13, at 
1907–08. 
 92 See generally, Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate 
Governance: Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 215, 216–17 (1999). 
 93 See Liability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  
 94 Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Immunity: An Application to 
Cyberspace, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2007). 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id.  
 97 Id. at 10–11. 
 98 Cf. PINTO, supra note 72, at 250. 
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Strict liability is alternatively, though similarly, described 
through a ratio test where the “costs externalized by an activity, 
even when conducted with reasonable care, substantially exceed 
the benefits externalized by that activity.”99 For example, two 
motorists driving past each other present one another with 
approximately equal risks. This is not the case, however, when a 
motorist drives past a blasting site and blasts shatter the 
motorist’s window. The use of explosives presents the motorist 
with a non-reciprocal risk (and costs externalized far greater 
than benefits externalized), for which the defendant in charge of 
the blasting site ought to be strictly liable. Strict liability 
therefore incentivizes blasters not only to consider using proper 
care in blasting but also to decide where to blast (i.e., away from 
cars), and to explore the feasibility of using safer substitutes (like 
a wrecking ball).100 
Strict liability offers an appropriate analogy to limited 
liability. First, by focusing on the activity level, it addresses 
academics’ concern that incorporation permits shareholders to 
externalize too many costs onto society in relation to benefits. 
Strict liability would hold shareholders liable despite their 
exercise of reasonable care, thereby discouraging owning stock in 
a way that mere negligence cannot: incenting shareholders to 
consider other organizational forms where capital providers are 
personally liable (i.e., partnerships and proprietorships), or 
proceed as shareholders (with personal liability) at their own 
peril.101 
Second, limited liability presents a non-reciprocal risk. Those 
persons with whom the corporation comes into contact (including 
both voluntary and involuntary creditors) are likely natural 
persons, with an assumed basic level of economic worth and 
earning capacity. The corporation, on the other hand, is by 
definition artificial and can easily exist without any such basic 
assumptions. The corporation could be a shell—completely 
worthless. Robert Monks aptly noted, “[t]he great problem of 
having corporate citizens is that they aren’t like the rest of us.”102 
“As Baron Thurlow in England is supposed to have said, ‘they 
have no soul to save, and they have no body to incarcerate.’”103 
Perhaps this is Hansmann and Kraakman’s actual concern 
 
 99 Hylton, supra note 94, at 12. 
 100 See Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 
1990); see also Hylton, supra note 94, at 12. 
 101 JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 249 (5th ed. 2013). 
 102 THE CORPORATION (Big Picture Media Corp. 2003). 
 103 Id. 
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regarding the corporate form: not that a corporation may be 
impecunious per se (because, judgment-proof natural persons 
similarly may leave uncompensated tort victims), but rather that 
their artificiality makes them (and their ownership of assets) 
distinctly unlike natural persons. Strict liability would address 
this non-reciprocal risk to society. 
Third, strict liability still retains a proximate cause 
analysis.104 Proximate cause is an additional limitation on a 
defendant’s culpability which requires that the defendant be 
liable only if their conduct is not only the actual cause of the 
plaintiff’s injury, but is also the cause as a matter of policy.105 
Proximate cause attempts to delimit a defendant’s liability to the 
kind of harm the possibility of which makes the activity 
abnormally dangerous.106 For example, in a famous strict liability 
case, a blasting operator who used reasonable care was not 
strictly liable to a plaintiff mink rancher whose mother mink 
trampled its kittens upon the vibrations resulting from the 
blasting.107 Proximate cause precluded liability given that the 
plaintiff’s mink ranching was an extraordinary and unusual use 
of his land.108  
Conventional proximate cause analysis is consistent with 
shareholder personal liability. Even Hansmann and Kraakman 
would limit shareholder liability for corporate torts to tort 
damages that the corporation’s assets cannot cover.109 Inability to 
pay tort creditors due to corporate undercapitalization is exactly 
the type of harm that makes the corporate form dangerous. 
Specifically, the corporation and its shareholders would use 
limited liability to externalize costs onto others.  
One particular Restatement form of strict liability—liability 
for abnormally dangerous activities—provides an intuitive 
framework for owning stock.110 Although liability for abnormally 
 
 104 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 105 DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 101, at 267. 
 106 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 107 Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 268 P.2d 645, 646 (Wash. 1954). 
 108 Id. at 648. 
 109 See Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 13, at 
1891–92. 
 110 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519–20 (AM. LAW. INST. 1977). True, one 
could argue that one should analyze shareholder strict liability under an analogy to the 
possession of livestock under the Restatement. How different, after all, is a psychopath 
from a wild animal? Cf id. § 504. My argument that owning stock is not an abnormally 
dangerous activity, however, would also—just as forcefully—indicate that owning stock 
under an analogy to livestock is not an activity for which a shareholder is strictly liable. 
Possessors of livestock are notably not strictly liable if the damages are “brought about by 
the . . . reckless or negligent conduct of a third person.” Id. § 504(3)(c). A corporation’s 
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dangerous activities attaches to ownership of tangible property or 
physical activity,111 Hansmann and Kraakman argue that 
“limited liability encourages excessive entry and aggregate 
overinvestment in unusually hazardous industries”112—the exact 
same types of activities to which strict liability often attaches. 
Moreover, it is not unthinkable that a court could consider 
applying theories of strict liability to the ownership of intangible 
assets—academics have analyzed the possible application of tort 
doctrine, including strict liability, to such intangible ventures as 
the provision of Internet services.113 Given these similarities, 
would shareholders be liable under this Restatement test? 
Should owning stock be considered an abnormally dangerous 
activity (or sufficiently analogous to it)?114 
B. Is Owning Stock an Abnormally Dangerous Activity? 
Introducing the Restatement and Indiana Harbor Belt 
Given the seeming compatibility between theories of strict 
liability and owning stock, it is worth exploring whether merely 
owning stock is sufficiently analogous to be considered an 
abnormally dangerous activity. The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts (Sections 519–20) gives a guideline for determining 
whether an activity is abnormally dangerous115: 
One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to 
liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting 
from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to 
prevent the harm. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the 
following factors are to be considered: 
 
officers and directors are such third persons. 
 111 See id. § 520 cmt. f (noting that an activity must create a danger of physical harm 
in order to be abnormally dangerous). 
 112 Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 13, at 
1883. 
 113 See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 94, at 16, 28 (analogizing digital code to physical 
property in order to apply tort doctrine, including strict liability, to Internet-borne 
injuries). 
 114 Arguably shareholding’s creation of physical harm is too derivative or too 
intangible to consider it an abnormally dangerous activity. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1977). However, as will become apparent, strict 
liability for abnormally dangerous activities crucially relies on a distinction between 
substances and activities. Such a distinction provides a strong analogy to the question of 
holding shareholders strictly liable for corporate torts and the conclusion that a 
negligence regime would apply. 
 115 See id. §§ 519–520. 
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(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land 
or chattels of others; 
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; 
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; 
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; 
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; 
and 
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its 
dangerous attributes.116 
The Section 520 factors on their face seem to offer mixed 
guidance.117 Some support the proposition that owning stock is 
abnormally dangerous.118 With regard to factor (c), shareholders 
(in such capacity) generally cannot eliminate the risk of 
undercapitalization by the exercise of reasonable care given that 
the board of directors and other delegated managerial officers 
control corporate activities, including decisions concerning 
corporate capitalization.119 Regarding factors (a) and (b), as 
mentioned, incorporation incentivizes investment in unusually 
hazardous industries which are inherently risky and potentially 
expose the corporation to massive tort liability for physical 
harm.120 Moreover (although perhaps not an issue of locality), 
under factor (e), through analogy, incorporation is clearly not 
always the appropriate legal entity through which a business 
firm should conduct its activities.121 In certain circumstances, 
such as when a corporation may be undercapitalized,122 a 
partnership or proprietorship is clearly preferable in order to 
limit cost externalization. 
Two factors are also unclear. Consider whether corporations 
are of common usage under factor (d). The Restatement comment 
on ‘common usage’ distinguishes between “automobiles [which] 
have come into such general use that their operation is a matter 
of common usage,” and “the operation of a tank or any other 
motor vehicle of such size and weight as to be unusually difficult 
 
 116 Id. 
 117 See id. 
 118 See id. 
 119 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(c). 
 120 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(a–b); see also The Essential Role of 
Organizational Law, supra note 13, at 423, 431–32. 
 121 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(e). 
 122 A corporation is undercapitalized when it fails “in good faith [to] put at the risk of 
the business unincumbered [sic] capital reasonably adequate for its prospective 
liabilities.” HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 303 (rev. ed. 
1946). 
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to control safely, or to be likely to damage the ground over which 
it is driven,” which is “abnormally dangerous.”123 Should 
corporations be considered cars or tanks? One the one hand, if 
the corporation in fact behaves irresponsibility toward society at 
large, is it not akin to a tank on the road? On the other, 
corporations are ubiquitous—undercapitalized corporations 
arguably less so. Finally, with regards to factor (f), as discussed 
in the introduction, it is unclear whether incorporation (and 
therefore limited liability) provides the community more value 
than the danger it presents. The Section 520 factors on their face 
are either indeterminate or favor strict liability. Moreover, 
Section 519 requires that the defendant be in control of the 
alleged abnormally dangerous activity.124 Do shareholders, 
through their limited control rights, have sufficient control over 
the corporation to be held strictly liable for corporate activity? 
Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company v. American 
Cyanamid Co., a well-known strict liability case decided by Judge 
Richard Posner, helps shed light on both the Section 520 factors 
and Section 519 control.125 In Indiana Harbor Belt, a chemical 
manufacturer, American Cyanamid Company (“Cyanamid”), 
leased a railroad tank car, filled it with a hazardous chemical 
(acrylonitrile), and shipped it.126 A Missouri Pacific Railroad 
train picked up the car.127 Later, at a small switching line within 
the Chicago metropolitan area, the switching line employees 
noticed fluid gushing from the bottom outlet of the car. 128 The 
Department of Environmental Protection subsequently ordered 
the switching line to take decontamination measures.129 The 
switching line sued Cyanamid for the costs of those measures.130 
The plaintiff argued that the transportation of acrylonitrile 
in bulk through the Chicago metropolitan area was an 
abnormally dangerous activity for which the manufacturer 
should be held strictly liable.131 The plaintiff argued that the 
defendant, as an ordinary manufacturer and passive shipper of 
hazardous materials, should be incented through strict liability 
to explore alternative shipping routes through less populated 
 
 123 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 124 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519. 
 125 Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 126 Id. at 1175 (describing acrylonitrile as “flammable at temperatures above 30 
degrees Fahrenheit, highly toxic, and possibly carcinogenic.”). 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id.  
 129 Id. 
 130 Id.  
 131 Id. at 1181.  
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areas.132 According to the plaintiff’s argument, introducing a 
hazardous chemical into a stream of commerce passing through 
the Chicago metropolitan area was enough to hold the 
manufacturer strictly liable.133 
Judge Posner rejected this argument and, in doing so, 
elaborated on the Section 520 factors, in particular Section 520(c) 
(the inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable 
care).134 In his view, someone could have prevented the accident 
through the use of reasonable care: 
No one suggests . . . that the leak in this case was caused by the 
inherent properties of acrylonitrile. It was caused by carelessness—
whether that of the [railroad tank car lessor] in failing to maintain or 
inspect the car properly, or that of Cyanamid in failing to maintain or 
inspect it, or that of the Missouri Pacific when it had custody of the 
car, or that of the switching line itself in failing to notice the ruptured 
lid, or some combination of these possible failures of care. Accidents 
that are due to a lack of care can be prevented by taking care; and 
when a lack of care can . . . be shown in court, such accidents are 
adequately deterred by the threat of liability for negligence.135 
Judge Posner held that because proper care of tank cars 
made the danger of an acrylonitrile spill negligible, there was no 
compelling reason to move to a regime of strict liability.136  
Judge Posner also helps us understand the bounds of Section 
519 control. Throughout his opinion, Judge Posner emphasized 
that the relevant activity for determining liability was not the 
mere manufacture of a dangerous chemical, but rather its 
transportation.137 To this end, he contrasted the defendant 
Cyanamid, the manufacturer-shipper, with the acrylonitrile 
carrier.138 Although manufacturer-shippers can, in theory, 
designate in the bill of lading a route of shipment, shippers 
cannot be expected to become “students of railroading in order to 
lay out the safest route by which to ship their goods.”139 They, as 
manufacturer-shipper, were not the relevant controlling actor 
best suited to determine whether to reroute hazardous chemicals. 
That actor was the chemical carrier: 
[U]ltrahazardousness or abnormal dangerousness is, in the 
contemplation of the law at least, a property not of substances, but of 
 
 132 Id.  
 133 Id. at 1175–80. 
 134 Id. at 1179. 
 135 Id. 
 136 See id.  
 137 See id. at 1181. 
 138 Id. at 1180. 
 139 Id. 
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activities: not of acrylonitrile, but of the transportation of acrylonitrile 
by rail through populated areas. Natural gas is both flammable and 
poisonous, but the operation of a natural gas well is not an 
ultrahazardous activity. . . . [T]he manufacturer of a product is not 
considered to be engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity merely 
because the product becomes dangerous when it is handled or used in 
some way after it leaves his premises, even if the danger is 
foreseeable. . . . The relevant activity is transportation, not 
manufacturing and shipping.140 
For these reasons, the manufacturer-shipper was held to be 
not strictly liable.141 
Judge Posner went on to express skepticism that the 
imposition of strict liability would have actually changed the 
aggregate expected accident costs.142 Even putting aside that 
rerouting would be prohibitively expensive—because new tracks 
would be needed to avoid metropolitan areas—it would require 
longer journeys over poorer quality tracks.143 Though the cost of 
each individual accident may decrease, the probability of an 
accident may very well increase.144 
Judge Posner did, in dicta, note that he could not exclude 
liability for the Indiana Harbor Belt defendant in certain 
hypothetical scenarios.145 Were there a less hazardous chemical 
substitute (non-existent in this case), a manufacturer could be 
strictly liable for shipment.146 Such an argument—relying on the 
inherent properties of acrylonitrile—would encourage the 
defendant to relocate the shipment or, more likely, reduce its 
scale by substitution.147 This would be especially true in a 
jurisdiction that accepts the Restatement Section 521 view that 
because common carriers cannot refuse service to a shipper of a 
lawful commodity, they are exempt from strict liability for the 
carriage of abnormally dangerous materials.148 Because of this 
exemption, the manufacturer is in a stronger relative position to 
consider whether to reroute its dangerous materials.149 Moreover, 
Cyanamid’s active participation in the chemical shipment by 
leasing and filling the tank car and contracting with the tank car 
 
 140 Id. at 1181 (citations omitted). 
 141 See id.  
 142 See id. at 1179. 
 143 See id. at 1180. 
 144 See id. 
 145 See id. at 1178. 
 146 See id. at 1181. 
 147 See id.  
 148 Id. at 1180. 
 149 See id. 
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lessee to maintain the tank car indicates that the shipper was 
sufficiently engaged in the relevant activity of transportation.150 
At the same time, however, Judge Posner noted this active 
participation may not necessarily indicate that strict liability 
ought to apply: active participation “imposed upon [Cyanamid] a 
duty of due care and by doing so brought into play a threat of 
negligence liability that, for all we know, may provide an 
adequate regime of accident control in the transportation of this 
particular chemical.”151 
C. Is Owning Stock an Abnormally Dangerous Activity? 
Applying the Restatement and Indiana Harbor Belt 
Indiana Harbor Belt provides valuable insight into whether 
owning stock is an abnormally dangerous activity. First, Indiana 
Harbor Belt makes clear that factor 520(c) (inability to eliminate 
the risk by the exercise of reasonable care) refers not just to any 
individual actor, but rather to that actor in the context of others.152 
In the context of the corporation, there normally are actors who 
can, through the use of reasonable care, mitigate the threat of cost 
externalization. Those actors are not the corporation’s 
shareholders, but rather its officers and directors. Officers and 
directors control corporate activities and, most relevant to 
shareholder personal liability, corporate capitalization.153 Like the 
carriers in control of a manufacturer’s dangerous chemicals, 
officers and directors control shareholders’ capital. When officers 
and directors use proper care, the risk that a corporation 
undercapitalizes and thereby leaves its tort creditors 
uncompensated becomes negligible. 
Judge Posner’s comments on adequate control under Section 
519 of the Restatement also shed light on the relevant activity 
necessary for the imposition of strict liability.154 Just as the 
manufacture of a volatile chemical merely constitutes the 
substance and its transportation the relevant activity, in the case 
of a corporation, stock ownership is the substance and corporate 
capitalization the activity. The relevant activity in the context of 
shareholder limited liability is not whether shareholders have 
provided (manufactured) the substance (capital) to the 
 
 150 Id. at 1181. Because the district court and plaintiff’s counsel ignored any 
distinction between a passive and active shipper and merely argued liability based on 
being the former, the court considered the distinction waived. Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 See id. at 1177; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520. 
 153 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 141–142 (West 2020). 
 154 Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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corporation, but rather how the corporation has decided to deploy 
capital (including any shareholder capital contribution). Though 
the manufacturer-shipper has some limited and derivative 
control over shipment of its chemicals, it ultimately entrusts the 
carrier to transport those chemicals in a specific manner. 
Shareholders in such capacity almost identically have limited 
control rights over their capital contribution but entrust their 
capital with the corporation’s officers and directors with the hope 
that they will deploy it and obtain an acceptable return on such 
capital.155 Even though it may be foreseeable that corporate 
officers and directors would deploy shareholder capital in a way 
that is dangerous (e.g., by undercapitalizing and externalizing 
costs onto third parties), shareholders in such capacity do not 
sufficiently engage in the activity to be strictly liable. Recall that 
even the decision whether to incorporate a firm (as opposed to 
creating a partnership) is in the hands of the board of directors, 
not shareholders.156 A corporation must be in existence before its 
shareholders are created.157 Shareholders are simply the 
manufacturer-shippers; corporate officers and directors are the 
carriers.158  
Judge Posner’s concern that strict liability is not applicable 
to the activity of transportation because it would not result in the 
desired lowering of expected accident costs rings true here as 
well.159 Judge Posner noted that rerouting would increase the 
length of the journey over poorer track.160 Just as rerouting 
would increase the length of the journey, shareholder personal 
liability would increase the cost of capital for projects.161 Because 
raising capital would become more difficult, corporations would 
be incentivized to attempt identical projects with less capital (i.e., 
undercapitalize). Just as rerouting may lead to the use of poorer 
tracks162, shareholder personal liability may lead to the 
contribution of inferior capital. Because debtholders retain 
limited liability, debt would become more favorable than equity, 
leading to excessive corporate leverage. Relatedly, an adverse 
selection problem may arise: poorer investors with fewer 
personal assets to lose will be more likely to invest as 
shareholders. So even if shareholders are personally liable, they 
 
 155 See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, ch. 1 (West 2020). 
 156 STOUT, supra note 65, at 42. 
 157 Id.  
 158 Indiana Harbor Belt, 916 F.2d at 1177–78. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. at 1180. 
 161 Id.  
 162 Id. 
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may not ultimately have the personal capital available to satisfy 
tort creditors. Ultimately, it is unlikely that there will be fewer 
uncompensated tort victims with the imposition of shareholder 
personal liability.163 
 Although Judge Posner does list in dicta some factors that 
may have made Cyanamid (the manufacturer-shipper) more 
likely to be held strictly liable164, they are not relevant to stock 
ownership. For example, he mentions the difference between an 
active and passive shipper.165 One could argue that controlling or 
activist shareholders should in this vein be strictly liable given 
that they have adequate control over the corporation and thereby 
become more like a chemical carrier. Again, the key question is 
whether negligence liability would prove an adequate regime of 
accident control. Ultimately, the corporation’s officers and 
directors still may use due care so as to make such accidents 
(that is, undercapitalization resulting in the externalization of 
costs) negligible. Judge Posner also mentions the possibility of 
strict liability if there were a less dangerous substitute for 
acrylonitrile and if the carriers were not held strictly liable for 
carrying lawful goods.166 Given that capital is fungible and that a 
corporation may reject certain capital in exchange for shares, an 
argument for shareholder strict liability based on the availability 
of less dangerous substitutes is not meaningfully applicable.167 
The clear conclusion from the Restatement and Indiana Harbor 
Belt is that shareholders in tort are not strictly liable when 
corporations undercapitalize.168 Negligence—the use of 
 
 163 See generally Grundfest, supra note 19, passim (explaining that the imposition of 
personal liability onto shareholders is easily circumvented and will not have the intended 
effect of increasing the corporation’s duty of care). 
 164 See 916 F.2d at 1180. 
 165 Id. at 1181. 
 166 Id. at 1180. 
 167 A situation where a shareholder could theoretically be strictly liable for his capital 
contribution would be if he had contributed not cash, but rather some sort of other asset 
with such illiquidity or volatility that it was ultimately worthless in the hands of the 
corporation directly leading to a corporation’s undercapitalization. Consider, for example, 
an exotic derivative product with an active market before the financial crisis which after 
the crisis became worthless. True, holding such shareholders strictly liable may not be a 
feasible method of accident avoidance given that directors perhaps breach their duty of 
care by accepting such capital. Were directors, however, like common carriers—required 
to accept any type of legal capital for stock—there would be a strong argument for such 
shareholder strict liability in this limited hypothetical situation. Shareholders could 
easily avoid the accident (by contributing a liquid, low volatility asset like cash) and the 
corporation could not (by refusing to accept such capital contribution). 
 168 See generally Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1177 (7th 
Cir. 1990); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-520. 
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reasonable care—provides a sufficient regime under which to 
prevent corporate undercapitalization. 
IV. CORPORATE LAW COMPARED 
How does corporate law’s treatment of shareholder liability 
differ from the treatment under tort law? Under corporate law, 
shareholders are generally not personally liable to a corporation’s 
creditors beyond their capital investment in the corporation.169 
This privilege, however, is not absolute.170 Shareholders may 
become personally liable for a corporation’s liabilities (including 
to tort creditors) under the equitable doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil.171 Though piercing the corporate veil is a poorly 
understood and hazy doctrine,172 creditors successfully do so in 
certain limited circumstances. First, in all instances, the 
shareholders exert a high degree of control over the 
corporation.173 Second, in the context of a tort claim, courts 
examine two general categories to determine liability: respect for 
corporate formalities and corporate capitalization.174 Courts 
generally require finding both to pierce the corporate veil.175 
Corporate formalities, in turn, may be grouped into legal, 
economic, and operational formalities.176 Legal formalities 
include whether to issue stock certificates, hold meetings, elect 
officers, and document loans and other transactions.177 Economic 
formalities refer to whether shareholders intermix their personal 
affairs with the corporation, such as failing to maintain a 
separate bank account for the corporation.178 Operational 
formalities refer to whether the corporation and shareholder 
share offices, employees, or otherwise seem to operate 
identically.179 To avoid undercapitalization and denial of separate 
entity privileges, “shareholders should in good faith put at the 
 
 169 See, e.g, Model Bus. Corp. Act § 6.22(b) (1985). 
 170 See generally, Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical 
Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991). 
 171 Id. at 1036. 
 172 Id. at 1036–37. 
 173 See Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 174 See id. When the creditor is a contract creditor, courts often ask whether the 
debtor misled the contract creditor regarding the corporation’s capitalization. See 
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 112. 
 175 See Kinney Shoe Corp., 939 F.2d at 212. 
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three overarching categories). 
 177 See id.  
 178 See id.  
 179 See id. at 211. 
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risk of the business unincumbered [sic] capital reasonably 
adequate for its prospective liabilities.”180 
Analysis of tort law’s treatment of limited liability sheds 
light on the hazy doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. The 
elements present in piercing the corporate veil perform the same 
function as those of tortious negligence. In order for a plaintiff to 
recover in a negligence action, he must establish (1) that the 
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, (2) that the defendant 
breached this duty by failing to use reasonable care, (3) which 
was the cause-in-fact and proximate cause of (4) plaintiff’s losses, 
or damages.181 When a shareholder fails to respect corporate 
formalities and controls the corporation , he personally has 
assumed a duty of care to corporate creditors both actual (i.e., in 
contract) and contingent (i.e., in tort).182 When a shareholder 
further undercapitalizes his corporation, thereby leaving a 
corporate creditor uncompensated, he breaches this duty by 
failing to use reasonable care. Such undercapitalization (a 
properly capitalized corporation would have been able to 
compensate reasonably the creditor)—the cause-in-fact and 
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s loss—results in shareholder 
personal liability to the plaintiff creditor for the resulting 
damages. 
True, under this framework, reasonable capitalization would 
still, at times, leave tort creditors uncompensated. But other 
corporate creditors (such as debtholders) are frequently left 
uncompensated. Though contract creditors were able, ex ante, to 
negotiate and price corporate risk, there is no fundamental 
difference in the price of risk (i.e., the risk of externalized costs) 
when one negotiates for actual financial debt as compared to 
appropriately insuring for contingent debt including debt owed to 
any potential tort creditor. Insurance performs the same ex ante 
function of risk pricing as the contract negotiation. Moreover, tort 
creditors of non-corporate natural persons are also, at times, 
ultimately uncompensated. The negligence regime merely forces a 
corporation—an artificial person—to mimic a natural one. A 
properly capitalized corporation faces no greater threat to society of 
externalizing costs than any other natural person. There is 
therefore no additional need in tort to force on the corporation’s 
shareholders the task of providing the corporation with additional 
insurance beyond what the corporation reasonably requires.  
 
 180 BALLANTINE, supra note 122, at 303. 
 181 DIAMOND ET AL, supra note 101, at 45. 
 182 Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1269 (2008). 
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One could argue that when a plaintiff successfully pierces 
the corporate veil, he normally may pierce the veil as to all 
shareholders, those more innocent and culpable alike.183 This, in 
turn, indicates that hypothetically innocent shareholders are 
strictly liable for corporate torts and corporate 
undercapitalization.184 As an example of a relatively innocent 
shareholder who would have been held liable, some point to 
Minton v. Cavaney.185 In that case, two promoters created a 
corporation to lease a swimming pool but never capitalized it (it 
never had any assets) and failed to respect corporate formalities, 
such as issuing stock.186 Cavaney, an attorney, assisted the two 
promoters in a temporary capacity as secretary, treasurer, and 
director of the corporation, likely as an accommodation to his 
client.187 When a victim drowned in the pool, her survivors, after 
winning a judgment against the corporation, sued Cavaney’s 
estate.188 Although reversed on other grounds, the court would 
have found Cavaney personally liable, noting that he was to 
receive one-third of the shares to be issued and that Cavaney 
kept corporate records in his office.189  
There are two problems with relying on Minton to conclude 
that innocent shareholders are “strictly liable” for corporate torts. 
First, when piercing the corporate veil, courts have normally not 
held truly passive shareholders personally liable.190 Second, to 
the extent that relatively innocent shareholders are liable, such 
liability is within the vein of Res Ipsa Loquitur, a negligence 
claim, not strict liability. Normally, a plaintiff bears the burden 
of proving each element of a negligence cause of action by a 
preponderance of the evidence.191 However, the doctrine of Res 
Ipsa Loquitur allows a plaintiff in limited situations to use 
circumstantial evidence to establish a defendant’s unreasonable 
conduct.192 It allows a jury to infer from that circumstantial 
conduct that a defendant acted unreasonably without any other 
proof.193 The circumstantial evidence is crucial to plaintiffs who 
otherwise would be unable to make specific allegations about 
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defendant malfeasance.194 Under the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts, Res Ipsa Loquitur allows the factfinder to “infer that the 
defendant has been negligent when the accident causing the 
plaintiff’s harm is a type of accident that ordinarily happens as a 
result of the negligence of a class of actors of which the defendant 
is the relevant member.”195 Put slightly differently, Res Ipsa 
Loquitur requires that the harm-causing event was probably due 
to negligence, and that the defendant was probably the culpable 
party. 
The defendant’s suggested liability in Minton arose in such a 
way. The harm—the corporation’s failure to satisfy a tort 
creditor’s judgment (i.e., undercapitalization)—was due to the 
board of directors’ negligence (failure to use reasonable care in 
capitalizing the corporation).196 Moreover, the defendant was 
probably a culpable party.197 Judge Roger Traynor noted that 
“evidence that Cavaney was to receive one-third of the shares to 
be issued supports an inference that he was an equitable owner, 
and the evidence that for a time the records of the corporation 
were kept in Cavaney’s office supports an inference that he 
actively participated in the conduct of the business.”198 The 
Defendant in Minton simply would have been unable to overcome 
these inferences (i.e., his burden): the defendant’s relationship 
with the promoters and the corporation itself was enough to 
establish the inference that he had sufficient control (that is, the 
act was probably negligence) over the corporation to be 
personally liable to its creditors (that is, he was probably the 
culpable party). 
Indeed, this is exactly a distinction Judge Posner discusses 
in Indiana Harbor Belt to highlight the difference between strict 
liability and negligence.199 In Indiana Harbor Belt, Judge Posner 
contrasts Siegler, where the court imposed strict liability on a 
transporter of hazardous materials. There, a gasoline truck blew 
up, obliterating Plaintiff’s decedent and decedent’s car. The 
explosion destroyed the evidence necessary to establish whether 
the accident had been due to negligence.200 Though the Siegler 
Plaintiff could have tried to base his claim in negligence through 
 
 194 Id.  
 195 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 17 
(AM. L. INST. 2010). 
 196 Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 578, 580 (1961). 
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 198 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 199 See Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F. 2d 1174, 1179–80 (7th 
Cir. 1990). 
  200 Id.  
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the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, the Siegler court turned to 
strict liability instead of Res Ipsa Loquitur because even if the 
defendant truck driver used all due care, a gasoline truck might 
well blow up without negligence on the part of the driver.201 In 
such a case, a plaintiff would be unable to invoke Res Ipsa 
Loquitur. The Plaintiff switching lines in Indiana Harbor Belt 
did not show such a danger.202 
Similarly, corporate undercapitalization does not present 
involuntary creditors with a risk that they could not otherwise 
prove fault without a strict liability regime. Though corporations 
may seem at times to “blow up,” there is always an evidentiary 
record (or lack thereof) to show whether a shareholder respected 
corporate formalities and adequately capitalized the corporation. 
The piercing the corporate veil regime again follows this logic.  
Res Ipsa Loquitur also helps illustrate the scope of piercing 
the corporate veil. Piercing only occurs within close corporations or 
within corporate groups, not public companies.203 As the number of 
shareholders increase, the less likely it becomes that a court will 
pierce.204 This is because, as Res Ipsa Loquitur suggests, with an 
increasing number of shareholders, it becomes more difficult for a 
tort plaintiff to suggest that the negligent conduct was probably 
tied to the particular shareholder defendant. Corporate law follows 
the logic tort law suggests: Shareholders are not strictly liable for 
corporate undercapitalization. They only become liable to the 
extent that they assume certain duties through the failure to 
respect corporate formalities and corporate control and then 
breach such duties by failing to use reasonable care in capitalizing 
the corporation.  
V. CORPORATE PURPOSE RECONSIDERED 
As discussed, the choice of regime between negligence and 
strict liability is one of comparison between externalized costs 
and benefits. When an activity externalizes more costs, strict 
liability ought to apply. When an activity externalizes more 
benefits, a negligence regime ought to apply.205 The idea that 
shareholders ought not be strictly liable for corporate 
undercapitalization therefore implies that incorporation 
externalizes more benefits than costs. 
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What is that externalized benefit? Shareholder provision of 
capital to corporations allows for the facilitation of optimal 
investment decisions.206 Under Modern Portfolio Theory, investors 
can minimize risk through diversification. This minimization, in 
turn, allows corporations a lower cost of capital because a 
corporation’s officers and directors need not consider non-systematic 
risk in making decisions. In a world of unlimited or strict 
shareholder liability, projects with a positive net present value 
(“NPV”) i.e., those that would benefit society would be rejected 
because the value of shares would be based not merely on the 
present value of the corporation’s expected future cash flows, but 
also something irrelevant to the investment decision: shareholder 
wealth. Piercing the corporate veil—a negligence regime—allows 
society to undertake NPV positive projects because incorporation 
allows a project to separate itself from its capital investors and 
stand on its own merits.207 
Piercing the corporate veil, however, teaches that although 
corporations do externalize benefits to society, they still invite 
shareholder opportunism (that is, externalized costs) when 
certain shareholders attempt to use the corporate form to 
artificially limit liabilities to creditors. For this reason, in order 
for shareholders to truly limit their liability, they must follow 
corporate formalities and, if acting as a corporate officer and/or 
director, adequately capitalize the corporation. These actions not 
only allow the corporation to stand on its own merits, but also 
relieve the shareholder from a personal duty to corporate 
creditors. This is because such actions force the corporation to 
internalize the costs that it would otherwise externalize onto its 
creditors. 
This is why—perhaps ironically—shareholders are only able 
to limit their liability when there is no ex ante value to limited 
liability. This is the case in a properly functioning corporation. 
True, shareholders may have an incentive to externalize these 
costs. Other corporate actors, however, have incentives not only 
contra the shareholders but also aligned with contingent (tort) 
creditors. Those actors typically mute any shareholder incentive 
to externalize costs. For example, because unsecured debtholders 
have a claim pari passu with a tort creditor, in exchange for debt 
capital, a debtholder will demand from the borrower and its 
subsidiaries an affirmative covenant to maintain reasonable 
 
 206 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 97. 
 207 Corp. Fin. Inst., Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT), 
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insurance.208 This covenant is ubiquitous with the possible 
exception of investment-grade borrowers with multi-billion dollar 
market capitalizations—enough to cover potential losses arising 
from a corporate tort.209 Without this covenant, the debtholder 
faces the material risk that a tort creditor’s claim will dilute his 
or her own. Corporate officers and directors—who not only have a 
substantial human capital investment in the corporation but also 
may face personal liability for their action (or inaction)—will also 
push the corporation to adequately insure so as to protect their 
human capital investment and personal assets. Even if 
putatively improperly incentivized by ownership of stock and 
stock options, risk aversion will lead Corporate Officers and 
Directors to D&O insurance.210 In turn, those insurers will 
increase their premiums in order to account for the costs of bad 
corporate governance. 211 As such, corporate actors are generally 
able to force the corporation to internalize otherwise externalized 
costs.212 
Piercing the corporate veil is needed when the corporation is 
not properly functioning—specifically, when other corporate 
actors are unable to prevent shareholders from successfully 
attempting to extract value from limited liability.213 To best 
understand when piercing the corporate veil applies, consider the 
relationship between shareholders and actual corporate creditors 
(namely debtholders), whose relationship can best be explained 
in terms of option theory. Both shareholders and debtholders 
have purchased a right to a corporation’s future profits and 
concomitantly made agreements with each other. Debtholders 
have sold a call option (the right to purchase any increase in a 
corporation’s value) on future profits to shareholders. 
Shareholders, meanwhile, have bought a put option from 
debtholders (that is, they have purchased the right to sell the 
corporation to debtholders). Shareholders pay for this put option 
 
 208 See MICHAEL BELLUCCI & JEROME MCCLUSKEY, THE LSTA’S COMPLETE CREDIT 
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through the terms of the corporate debt, including, but not 
limited to, the debt’s interest rate, covenants, and tenor. 
In the case of a tort creditor, piercing the corporate veil 
similarly prohibits shareholders from using the corporate form to 
obtain a free (or discounted) put option from contingent creditors 
(including potential tort creditors) with whom the corporation 
cannot negotiate ex ante.214 It forces the corporation to internalize 
the risks it poses to tort creditors through some sort of  
insurance: either through contracting with a third-party insurer or 
through self-insurance (i.e., additional equity capital). This 
insurance performs the identical function as the ex ante negotiated 
purchase of a put option, in effect turning those involuntary 
creditors into voluntary creditors.215 This is exactly why share 
prices of California corporations did not meaningfully change with 
the introduction of limited liability: corporations had already 
internalized costs so as to make the value of shareholder indemnity 
for corporate torts negligible.216 
This understanding, in turn, helps us understand the extent 
of the NPV analysis discussed previously in the context of 
piercing the corporate veil. The NPV analysis ought to be 
performed not at the level of shareholder returns, but rather at 
the level of the corporate whole. Shareholders cannot use the 
corporate form to shield themselves artificially from liability to 
creditors. Said slightly differently, shareholders only risk losing 
limited liability by attempting to use the corporate form to make 
an otherwise negative NPV project into a positive one through 
the externalization of costs onto creditors. Such an action would 
without the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil (and unlike the 
California firms previously mentioned) result in an artificially 
higher share price through the externalization of costs onto 
others. Piercing the corporate veil allows creditors to make an 
enterprise stand on its own merits, which in turn requires those 
culpable shareholders to bear the realized costs of negative NPV 
projects.217 
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For this reason, in order for shareholders to avail themselves 
fully of limited liability, the corporation’s NPV analysis must 
consider and adequately discount the costs not only of actual 
creditors, such as debtholders or trade creditors, but also 
contingent creditors, which include any potential tort creditor. 
Firms internalizing those risks (through more expensive 
insurance) will be less incented to engage in excessively risky 
activity. Moreover, by internalizing such risk, the corporation no 
longer imposes the risk of cost externalization onto involuntary 
creditors made possible by corporate undercapitalization. 
Finally, this understanding of NPV, which requires that 
corporations consider not merely their shareholders, but also 
other corporate stakeholders in investment decisions, supports 
and augments another theory of the corporation.218 According to 
stakeholder welfare theory, in calculating social benefits from 
corporate activity, the corporation should not focus merely on 
benefits to equity investors, but rather on other stakeholders like 
employees, customers, suppliers, and the community.219 A 
corporation must, in considering a NPV analysis at the corporate 
level, look to maximize corporate welfare because each of these 
stakeholders is ultimately either an actual or contingent creditor. 
The corporation and its shareholders are free to maximize 
profits, but only to the extent that the corporation reasonably 
considers and mitigates the risks the corporate form presents to 
all stakeholders through undercapitalization. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have argued that tort law would treat 
shareholder personal liability under a negligence regime and not 
strict liability, and that a negligence regime closely resembles the 
current corporate law regime. There are several important 
conclusions to draw from this argument, namely, that both 
advocates and critics of shareholder strict liability may be 
disappointed under a regime of strict shareholder personal 
liability. Advocates of limited liability may be disappointed by 
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the fact that the costs of capital are unlikely to rise substantially. 
Corporations can, through their officers and directors, use due 
care to prevent undercapitalization, just as the vast majority of 
chemical spills by railroads are preventable by due care. If this 
statement is true, strict liability should only cause a slight, not 
substantial, increase in the cost of capital because the 
incremental liability it would create would also be slight.220 
Similarly, critics of shareholder limited liability may not find 
strict shareholder personal liability to be the panacea they hope 
it to be given the only slightly increased incremental liability. 
Additionally, expected accident costs may not meaningfully 
change (or even increase), resulting in the same (or greater) 
incentive to externalize costs under the present regimes of 
shareholder limited liability. 
This investigation presents two ideas for possible further 
areas of research. First, to the extent piercing the corporate veil 
differs from an action in negligence, corporate law may 
unnecessarily invite unwelcome opportunism through the 
current limited liability regime. Second, recall that Hansmann 
and Kraakman argue that limited liability is likely a historical 
accident. Perhaps there is a historical connection between the 
rise of strict liability and limited liability worthy of further study. 
The corporate form ultimately benefits society but invites 
detrimental opportunism through its potential to externalize 
costs. Though at first glance it may be appealing to argue that 
shareholders ought to be personally liable for corporate torts 
given such potential, corporate law seems to correctly follow tort 
law in concluding that shareholders are not strictly personally 
liable for corporate torts—negligence applies; that is, the limited 
liability regime. Tort law does not justify itself based on finding 
the deepest pockets, but rather on asking which liability regime 
best addresses the relevant tort. It suggests that negligence, not 
strict liability, is the appropriate regime in tort for shareholders 
of a corporation. Corporate law correctly follows this intuition. 
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